博客2015国际经济法年会
❶ 哪里可以找到更多的国际经济法案例谢谢大家
不太清楚 不过你可以说说你想知道什么 我或许能帮你
❷ 关于国际经济法的网站
以下几个网站不错:
http://www.ila-hq.org/
http://www.csil.org.tw/
http://www.un.org/chinese/law/lawtxt.htm
http://www.ili.org/
http://www.cel.cn/
另外还有如下:
http://www.chinainterlaw.org/default.asp 国际法论坛
http://www.lib.whu.e.cn/dh/gjfn/yjjg.htm 国际法研究机构
以上都是我认为较好的,也是我常进去的网站,希望对你有帮助
❸ 国际经济法大师、教授、专家请进!
问题一:CFR术语的意思是cost and freight,即货物的价格由成本加运费构成,不包括保险费,其风险转移的时间是货交承运人时。该术语中卖方虽负责订立运输合同并支付运费,但对货物在途风险概不负责。本案中中国卖方不承担水果腐烂损失;国际运输业务中,依据通行的《海牙规则》(倾向于维护船方利益),船方只负有适航义务、管货义务和不做不适当绕航义务,对管船过失是免责的,即使船方在船只搁浅中存有过错也不承担责任。所以水果腐烂的损失只能由买方承担。买方规避风险的最好方法就是事先投保,由于CFR术语中货物并未投保,买方所负风险较大。
问题二:Q1:在国际货物运输保险制度中,平安险承保范围最小,单独海损不理赔;水渍险只承保海上险,外来风险不赔;一切险也不是什么风险都赔,它只比水渍险多了一项一般外来险。就本案而言,途中烧毁的化肥属于单独海损,是水渍险的承包范围,由保险公司负责;救火过程中湿毁的化肥属于共同海损,也是水渍险的承保范围,均由保险公司赔偿,买方没有损失;
Q2:降价销售是由于装船迟延所致,但由于船方已经倒签提单,只能自己承担货物延迟的责任。而后再依据B公司的保函向其索赔。姑且不说倒签提单船方不易再找到托运方,即使顺利找到并成功提起诉讼,由于装船迟延的始作俑者就是船方,所以船方承担损失几乎是肯定的。
❹ 国际经济法案例分析
法国政府行使税收管辖权的原因是收入来源地税收管辖权,美国行使的依据是居民税收管辖权,居民税收管辖权的自然人居民身份确认主要有住所标准和居所标准。
❺ 国际经济法的对外经济
源远流长的中国对外经济交往及其法理原则
中国的对外经济交往,可以大体划分为三个阶段:
1.古代中国时期,即奴隶社会后期和封建社会时期,约相当于公元前四、五世纪至公元1840年;
2.半殖民地半封建中国时期,约相当于公元1840年至1949年;
3.社会主义新中国时期,即公元1949年以后。
一、古代中国的对外经济交往及其法理内涵
(一)古代中国对外经济交往简况
夏朝时期,各个部落联盟之间就时常开展跨越联盟疆界的贸易。商朝时期,商品交换关系有了进一步的发展,并且开始使用原始形态的货币。到了周朝,实行“朝贡贸易”。春秋战国时期,开始出现同海外欧洲国家之间的贸易往业,明显的标志是:早在公元前四五世纪之间,中国的丝绸就已开始辗转远销希腊等地。
秦朝时中国与印度支那半岛、朝鲜半岛两个半岛广大地区的经济贸易往来是相当密切的。
汉朝对外经济交往也日益发达,开拓了 “丝绸之路”,又辟海市。经过隋朝进入唐朝,全国重新统一安定,对外经济文化交往也空前兴旺发达。
宋朝时期,政府侧重于在南方发展海上国际贸易。元朝建立陆上国际商道畅通无阻,海上贸易也有新的发展。
明代初期,多沿袭元朝,且又有重大发展,如郑和下西洋。明代中叶以后,关闭口岸,停止对外贸易,实行“锁国”政策。清朝则变本加厉实行“海禁”,虽一度解禁开港,但对外来商人一律严加限制。
(二)古代中国对外经济交往的法理内涵
第一,古代中国开展对外经济交往,是国内生产力发展的结果,也是生产力进一步发展所必需。
第二,古代中国的对外经济交往,其主要动因植根于社会生产力的发展。秦汉以来,两千多年的对外经济交往史上,虽然经历了许多曲折和起落,但总的来说,积极开展对外经济交是主流。
第三,在古代中国长期的对外经济交往中,基本上体现了自主自愿和平等互利的法理原则。
第四,古代中国的对外经济交往由于历史的和阶级的局限,其规模和意义都难以与近现代的对外经济交往相提并论。
二、半殖民地半封建中国的对外经济交往及其“法理”内涵
(一)半殖民地半封建中国对外经济交往简况
继1840年英国侵华的鸦片战争之后,殖民主义、帝国主义列强又发动了多次侵华战争。用战争暴力打败中国,强迫中国订立了许多不平等条约,攫取了各种政治、经济特权,严重破坏了中国的政治主权和经济主权,形成了中国对外经济交往中的恶性循环。
(二)强加于半殖民地半封建中国对外经济交往的“法理”
在这个时期里,由于中国的政治主权和经济主权受到严重破坏,中国的对外经济交往始终贯穿着两条线索:第一,中国对外经济交往中,往往处在非自愿、被强迫的地位,受制于人,听命于人。第二,中国总是遭到不平等的屈辱,忍受不等价的交换。弱肉强食的原则,不仅被列强推崇为“文明”国家的正当行为准则,而且通过国际不平等条约的缔结和签订,取得了国际法上的合法地位和约束力。
三、社会主义新中国的对外经济交往及其法理原则
(一)独立自主精神的坚持
与平等互利原则的贯彻
独立自主和平等互利,乃是新中国在对外经济交往中一贯坚持的最基本的法理原则和行为规范,也是中国对外经济交往健康发展的两大基石。它由国家的根本正式加以肯定和固定,上升为具有法律拘束力和基本行为规范。
(二)闭关自守意识的终结与对外开放观念的更新
半殖民地时期中国长期遭受的历史屈辱,本世纪五六十年代帝国主义所强加于中国的经济封锁,以及霸权主义背信弃义对中国所造成的经济破坏,都激发了和增强了中国人民独立自主、自力更生、奋发图强的意识。但是,在中国特定的历史条件下,也产生了对于独立自主、自力更生的片面认识和错误理解。对外经济交往受到重大的消极影响,使中国的社会主义经济建设失去了调动国外积极因素的良机,拉大了与先进国家经济发展水平的差距。
党的第十一届三中全会,作出了把工作重点转移到社会主义现代化建设上来的战略决策,这是新中国建国以来具有深远历史意义的伟大转折,使源远流长的中国对外经济交往,开始进入一个崭新的、更加自觉、更加成熟的历史发展阶段。
1993年,中国宪法正式规定:“国家实行社会主义市场经济”;党的第十四届三中全会针对在中国建立社会主义市场经济体制问题,提出了纲领性的文件,大大加强了对外开放的力度、广度和深度。
第五节 贯彻对外开放基本国策与学习国际经济法
一、中国实行经济上对外开放国策的主要根据
它是在总结该国多年实践经验以及参考国际实践经验的基础上提出来的。中国在实现“四化”过程中不应该、也不可能孤立于国际社会之外。中国应积极参加和利用国际分工,实行平等互利的国际交换,大力发展开放型经济,使国内经济与国际经济实现互接互补。
因此,中国在进行社会主义建设的过程中,一定要学会充分利用国内和国外两种资源,开拓国内和国外两个市场,学会组织国内建设和发展对外经济交往两套本领。
二、深入学习国际经济法对贯彻上述基该国策的重大作用
其主要意义,可大体归纳为:
第一,依法办事:世界各国经济交往日益频繁,十分需要借助于国际经济法的统一行为规范加以指导、调整和约束。中国应积极参加国际经济交往,对于这种法律规范的现状和发展趋向,需深入了解,自觉地“依法办事”,避免因无知或误解引起无谓的纠纷,造成不应有的损失。
第二,完善立法:广泛深入地了解上述规范和惯例的有关内容,使中国涉外经济法的立法、司法和行政执法工作有所借鉴,为社会主义市场经济提供法律规范和日益完善的法制保障。
第三,以法护权:要熟悉国际经济法的有关规定,和有关国家的涉外经济法的有关知识,在“国际官司”中,运用法律手段来维护中国的应有权益。
第四,据法仗义:建立新的国际经济秩序要以国际经济法作为一种手段,按照公平合理和平等互利的原则,为全世界众多弱小民族仗义执言和争得公道,促进国际经济秩序的新旧更替。
第五,发展法学:立足于该国的实际,以该国利益为核心,重点研究该国对外经济交往中产生的法律问题,作出符合其该国权益的分析和论证。逐步创立起以马克思主义为指导的,具有中国特色的国际经济法学科体系。
❻ 国际经济法案例
你可以申请有管辖权的法院中止支付信用证项下的款项,但限于开征申请人、开证专行、和其他属利害关系人。但是申请中止附加了很多限制条件,如未进行付款、未承兑、未保兑、未议付。同时需要法院有管辖权,申请人提供确切的证据,情况紧急,不中止将会造成重大损害,申请人提供可靠、充分的担保。如有疑问可具体询问
❼ 国际经济法,急!
合同双方合意不违返法律法规都可以,采用这种方式,不是很有利于卖方就是了!
首先解释一下,CIF(成本+运费+保险)
COST,INSURANCE AND FREIGHT(…named port of destination)--成本加保险费、运费(…指定目的港)是指卖方必须在合同规定的装运期内在装运港将货物交至运往指定目的港的船上,负担货物越过船舷为止的一切费用和货物灭失或损坏的风险,并负责办理货运保险,支付保险费,以及负责租船或订舱,支付从装运港到目的港的运费。
按照《1990年通则》,CIF合同买卖双方的主要义务如下:
(一) 卖方的主要义务
1. 负责在合同规定的日期或期间内,在装运港将符合合同的货物交至运往指定目的港的船上,并给予买方充分的通知;
2. 负责办理货物出口手续,取得出口许可证或其他核准书;
3. 负责租船或订舱,并支付至目的港的运费;
4. 负责办理货物运输保险,支付保险费;
5. 负担货物在装运港越过船舷为止的一切费用和风险;
6. 负责提供商业发票,保险单和货物运往约定目的港的通常运输单据。如果买卖双方约定采用电子通信,则所有单据可被具有同等效力的电子数据交换信息所替代。
(二) 买方的主要义务
1. 负责按合同规定支付价款;
2. 负责办理货物进口手续,取得进口许可证或其他核准书;
3. 负担货物在装运港越过船舷后的一切费用和风险;
4. 收取卖方按合同规定交付的货物,接受与合同相符的单据。
在采用CIF术语时,需注意以下几点:
1. CIF合同属"装运合同",尽管我们通常称之为"到岸价",但这是指价格的构成,是由成本运费+保险费。而不是指卖方也负责货物到岸前的风险。卖方在按合同规定的装运地将货物交付装运后,对货物可能发生的任何风险不再承担责任。
2. 卖方应及时租船订舱。
3. 卖方应按合同要求办理保险,有关保险责任的起讫期限必须与货物运输相符合,并必须至迟自买方需负担货物灭失或损坏的风险时(即自货物在装运港越过船舷时)起对买方的保障生效。该保险责任的期限必须展延至货物到达约定的目的港为止。
4. 卸货费用的负担,常用CIF术语的变形来表示,例如:
2 CIF班轮条件(CIF liner terms),指卸货费用按班轮条件处理,由支付运费的一方(即卖方)负担;
2 CIF舱底交货(CIF ex ship's hold),指买方负担将货物从舱底起吊卸到码头的费用;
2 CIF吊钩交货(CIF ex tackle),指卖方负担将货物从舱底吊至船边卸离吊钩为止的费用;
2 CIF卸到岸上(CIF landed),指卖方负担将货物卸到目的港岸上的费用。
5.CIF合同属于象征性交货(symbolic delivery)合同。卖方只提交符合合同要求的单据,即等同于交付货物,即使在卖方提交单据时,货物已经灭失或损坏,买方仍必须凭单据付款,但他可凭提单向船方或凭保险单向保险公司要求赔偿。
再解释一下,水渍险
水渍险的责任范围除了包括“平安险”的各项责任外,还负责被保险货物由于恶劣气候、雷电、海啸、地震、洪水等自然灾害所造成的部分损失。
平安险这一名称在我国保行业中沿用甚久。人其英文原意是指单独海损不负责赔偿。根据国际保险界对单独海损的解释,它是指部分损失。因此,平安险的原来保障范围只赔全部损失。但在长期实践的过程中对平安险的责任范围进行了补么和修订,当前平安险的责任范围已经超出只赔全损的限制。概括起来,这一险别的责任范围主要包括:
a. 运输过程中,由于自然灾害和运输工具发生意外事件,民被保险货物的实物的实际全损或推定全损。
B. 由于运输工具遭搁浅、触礁、沉没、互撞。与流一其他物体碰撞以及失火、爆炸等意外事故造成被保险货物的部分损失。
C. 只要运输工具曾经发生搁浅、触礁、沉没、焚毁等意外事故,不论这意个事故发生之前或者以后曾在海上遭恶劣气候、雷电、海啸等自然灾害所造成的被保险货物的部分损失。
D. 在装卸转船过程中,被保险货物一件或数件落海所造成的全部损失或部分损失。
E. 运输工具遭自然灾害或意外事故,在避难港卸货所引起被保险货物的全部损失或部分损失。
F. 运输工具遭自然或灾害或意外事故,需要在中途的港口或者在避难港口停靠,因而引起的卸货、装货、存仓以及运送货物所产生的特别费用。
G. 发生共同海损所引起的牺牲、公摊费和救助费用。
H. 发生了保险责任范围内的危险,被保险人对货物采取抢求、防止或少损失的各种措施,因而产生合理施遇用。但是保险公司承担费用的限额不能超过这批被救货物的保险金额。施救费用可以在赔款金额以外的一个保险金额限度内承担。
❽ 关于国际经济法的一道案例题
(1)有理,应支付。(2)可以,只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
“天不想亮”你懂不懂啊?这是英国法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰剂案!
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)
The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.
"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.
"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."
The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist’s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.
Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.
Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight’s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.
Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.
Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person’s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer’s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:
Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.
看不懂?我给你大致讲一下。法官是这么说的,虽然说广告是对不特定人提出的,一般情况下属于要约邀请(ITT),但是本案中,被告不仅将悬赏内容写得十分具体,而且已经把1000英镑存进银行,充分显示出它愿意受到该广告内容的约束(to be bound),所以符合了要约的根本特征,即受约束的意思表示。所以,本案中的广告是一个要约。而原告通过购买并使用薰剂的行为作出了行为承诺。有要约,有承诺,这个合同就成立了。
英美法教材用这个案例来说明,要约不一定要向特定人发出,只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
❾ 国际经济法
呵呵``所有大学生入学前都会这样想的``
1,就业前景良好,我国在法律方面的人才很专缺乏.再加上经济全球化,国际经属济方面的法学人才就更加吃香了.
2,我不是学法的,我学经济,第二学位是法.建议大一有空就多读读法条和法条解释,虽然很枯燥,在你第一年基础课的时候几乎没什么用,但是你会发现当你后面学的时候会轻松很多.
3,外语的话有法律专业英语.你还可以看原版的法条.这个一半图书馆有阅览的,网上也有,再就是看著名国际官司的实录,比如克林顿的.
4,政府肯定是需要的``不过我认为做跨国企业的法律顾问可能更那个些``呵呵``