國際經濟法配套測試十四

⑴ 國際經濟法案例分析。。

1、銀行有沒有拒權利付，要看受益人是否按照信用證的規定行事和交單，而本案例並未說明信用證的最遲裝運期，只是說「合同約定：...自B公司收到信用證之日起1個月內裝運。隨後，A公司於5月29日開出了符合約定的信用證」，但是沒有說B公司是於哪一天收到的信用證，因此無從判定受益人於7月3日裝運是否遲於信用證規定的裝運期。所以說本案例的銀行拒付是否有理。

那麼為了解答本案例，那麼就假設受益人遲於信用證規定的最遲裝運期裝運，如果假設成立，那麼才可以說銀行有權拒付——因為信用證是有條件的付款承諾，即受益人必須按照信用證的規定行事，包括按照信用證規定的期限裝運貨物和提交符合信用證規定的單據，否則開證行就有權拒付。那麼前面假設受益人未按期裝運，所以，開證行拒付有理。

而假設而本案例中的受益人未遲於信用證規定的裝運期裝運，那麼開證行就沒有拒付的權利。

2、「由於台風登陸，使得B公司最快到7月3日才裝船出運」，那麼，假設受益人交貨遲於信用證規定的最遲交貨期，對於信用證而言，受益人屬於違約，而其違約責任就是被開證行拒付。而對於合同而言，由於台風屬於不可抗力，那麼，因收台風影響而推遲交貨，則不算違約，因為不可抗力屬於免責條款。

3、該批貨物的價格條款為FOB，所以保險費用不包括在單價里。保險合同應由買方A公司負責訂立。

⑵ 國際經濟法 試題

1、b d
4、c d
5、b c
12、c
13、d
14、d

⑶ 國際經濟法的一道案例題

（1）有理，應支付。（2）可以，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
「天不想亮」你懂不懂啊？這是英國法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰劑案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist』s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight』s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person』s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer』s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我給你大致講一下。法官是這么說的，雖然說廣告是對不特定人提出的，一般情況下屬於要約邀請（ITT），但是本案中，被告不僅將懸賞內容寫得十分具體，而且已經把1000英鎊存進銀行，充分顯示出它願意受到該廣告內容的約束（to be bound）,所以符合了要約的根本特徵，即受約束的意思表示。所以，本案中的廣告是一個要約。而原告通過購買並使用薰劑的行為作出了行為承諾。有要約，有承諾，這個合同就成立了。
英美法教材用這個案例來說明，要約不一定要向特定人發出，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
打字不易，如滿意，望採納。

⑷ 國際經濟法試題

23、b c d
24、<1> b
<2> a b c d
<3> a b c d
<4> a
<5> b
<6> c
<7> c

⑸ 國際經濟法案例分析

法國政府行使稅收管轄權的原因是收入來源地稅收管轄權，美國行使的依據是居民稅收管轄權，居民稅收管轄權的自然人居民身份確認主要有住所標准和居所標准。

⑹ 國際經濟法有哪些經典案例

一、國際經濟法的三個層次

私人之間跨國商事交易關系——跨國鋼材進出口合同——違約
政府與私人之間跨國經濟管制關系——美國政府保障措施——關稅
國家之間跨國經濟交往關系——GATT/WTO多邊世界貿易協定體系——保障措施條約

二、三個層次的法律問題
進出口當事人是否有效？是否是不是違約？出口方如何得到救濟？進口方如何抗辯？涉及哪些法律？
美國政府的保障措施決定是否符合其國內法？受到影響的國內國外當事人是否可以提出申訴？涉及哪些法律？
中國是否可以向美國提出質疑？是否能夠從國家間爭議角度解決？涉及哪些法律？

三、三個層次的法律解決

首先，看合同是否成立，涉及到中美合同法規則和國際合同公約，可以認定合同已經有效成立，那麼，進口方的行為就屬於違約，可以追究其違約責任，但是，進口方可以抗辯，主張美國政府行為構成情勢變更，這樣，就可能免責。

其次，美國政府採取進口保障措施是基於其1974年貿易法第201條款，其中規定外國進口導致美國相關產業受到嚴重損害或其威脅則有權進行調查，如果進口與損害之間存在因果關系，則可以由國際貿易委員會提出建議，由美國總統決定是否採取進口保障措施。因而，美國政府的做法是有國內法依據的。至於外國受到影響的私人當事人，根據美國法律，卻沒有申訴權，所以，無法從美國國內法尋求救濟。

⑺ 國際經濟法案例求答案

1.（1）2.（1）3.（2）4.（1）5.（3）6.（3）7.（2）8.（1）9.（2）