國際經濟法02任務0020

A. 跪求國際經濟法案例分析答案

1.CISG的使用標準是營業地標准，股本合同爭議可以適用。
2.2月20日成立。因為CISG採到達主義，承諾到內達對方容是合同成立。
3.不能，因為CIF的風險轉移制度規定只要貨物交付給承運人，所有貨物的一切損失都由買方承擔，除非貨物的這種損害或缺陷是因為賣方的原因引起的。本題中是因為承運人的疏忽而導致貨物的滅失，與托運人無關。
4.均有賣方即中國A公司，可以，因為保險的受益人是買方。
5.承擔責任，因為不屬於免責的范圍之內。要對買方即美國B公司。
6.不可以，信用證支付方式是准村的單證交易，實際貨物的交易狀況不能影響信用證貨款的交付。

不知道這樣回答您滿意嗎？

B. 國際經濟法,急!

合同雙方合意不違返法律法規都可以，採用這種方式，不是很有利於賣方就是了！
首先解釋一下，CIF(成本+運費+保險)
COST,INSURANCE AND FREIGHT(…named port of destination)--成本加保險費、運費（…指定目的港）是指賣方必須在合同規定的裝運期內在裝運港將貨物交至運往指定目的港的船上，負擔貨物越過船舷為止的一切費用和貨物滅失或損壞的風險，並負責辦理貨運保險，支付保險費，以及負責租船或訂艙，支付從裝運港到目的港的運費。

按照《1990年通則》，CIF合同買賣雙方的主要義務如下：

（一） 賣方的主要義務

1． 負責在合同規定的日期或期間內，在裝運港將符合合同的貨物交至運往指定目的港的船上，並給予買方充分的通知；

2． 負責辦理貨物出口手續，取得出口許可證或其他核准書；

3． 負責租船或訂艙，並支付至目的港的運費；

4． 負責辦理貨物運輸保險，支付保險費；

5． 負擔貨物在裝運港越過船舷為止的一切費用和風險；

6． 負責提供商業發票，保險單和貨物運往約定目的港的通常運輸單據。如果買賣雙方約定採用電子通信，則所有單據可被具有同等效力的電子數據交換信息所替代。

（二） 買方的主要義務

1． 負責按合同規定支付價款；

2． 負責辦理貨物進口手續，取得進口許可證或其他核准書；

3． 負擔貨物在裝運港越過船舷後的一切費用和風險；

4． 收取賣方按合同規定交付的貨物，接受與合同相符的單據。

在採用CIF術語時，需注意以下幾點：

1. CIF合同屬"裝運合同"，盡管我們通常稱之為"到岸價"，但這是指價格的構成，是由成本運費+保險費。而不是指賣方也負責貨物到岸前的風險。賣方在按合同規定的裝運地將貨物交付裝運後，對貨物可能發生的任何風險不再承擔責任。

2. 賣方應及時租船訂艙。

3. 賣方應按合同要求辦理保險，有關保險責任的起訖期限必須與貨物運輸相符合，並必須至遲自買方需負擔貨物滅失或損壞的風險時（即自貨物在裝運港越過船舷時）起對買方的保障生效。該保險責任的期限必須展延至貨物到達約定的目的港為止。

4. 卸貨費用的負擔，常用CIF術語的變形來表示，例如：

2 CIF班輪條件（CIF liner terms），指卸貨費用按班輪條件處理，由支付運費的一方（即賣方）負擔；

2 CIF艙底交貨（CIF ex ship's hold），指買方負擔將貨物從艙底起吊卸到碼頭的費用；

2 CIF吊鉤交貨（CIF ex tackle），指賣方負擔將貨物從艙底吊至船邊卸離吊鉤為止的費用；

2 CIF卸到岸上（CIF landed），指賣方負擔將貨物卸到目的港岸上的費用。

5.CIF合同屬於象徵性交貨(symbolic delivery)合同。賣方只提交符合合同要求的單據，即等同於交付貨物，即使在賣方提交單據時，貨物已經滅失或損壞，買方仍必須憑單據付款，但他可憑提單向船方或憑保險單向保險公司要求賠償。

再解釋一下，水漬險
水漬險的責任范圍除了包括「平安險」的各項責任外，還負責被保險貨物由於惡劣氣候、雷電、海嘯、地震、洪水等自然災害所造成的部分損失。
平安險這一名稱在我國保行業中沿用甚久。人其英文原意是指單獨海損不負責賠償。根據國際保險界對單獨海損的解釋，它是指部分損失。因此，平安險的原來保障范圍只賠全部損失。但在長期實踐的過程中對平安險的責任范圍進行了補么和修訂，當前平安險的責任范圍已經超出只賠全損的限制。概括起來，這一險別的責任范圍主要包括：

a. 運輸過程中，由於自然災害和運輸工具發生意外事件，民被保險貨物的實物的實際全損或推定全損。

B. 由於運輸工具遭擱淺、觸礁、沉沒、互撞。與流一其他物體碰撞以及失火、爆炸等意外事故造成被保險貨物的部分損失。

C. 只要運輸工具曾經發生擱淺、觸礁、沉沒、焚毀等意外事故，不論這意個事故發生之前或者以後曾在海上遭惡劣氣候、雷電、海嘯等自然災害所造成的被保險貨物的部分損失。

D. 在裝卸轉船過程中，被保險貨物一件或數件落海所造成的全部損失或部分損失。

E. 運輸工具遭自然災害或意外事故，在避難港卸貨所引起被保險貨物的全部損失或部分損失。

F. 運輸工具遭自然或災害或意外事故，需要在中途的港口或者在避難港口停靠，因而引起的卸貨、裝貨、存倉以及運送貨物所產生的特別費用。

G. 發生共同海損所引起的犧牲、公攤費和救助費用。

H. 發生了保險責任范圍內的危險，被保險人對貨物採取搶求、防止或少損失的各種措施，因而產生合理施遇用。但是保險公司承擔費用的限額不能超過這批被救貨物的保險金額。施救費用可以在賠款金額以外的一個保險金額限度內承擔。

C. 國際經濟法案例分析題 跪求！！！

1）要約人抄是香港A商。受要約人襲是上海B公司。
2）3）自己看概念
4）A公司未成功撤銷自己的發盤。撤銷要件之一必須在受要約人作出承諾以前到達被要約人。事實上當他向香港電報局交發電報之前，B公司已經向上海電報局交發了對上述發盤接受的電報。未在受要約人承諾之前將撤銷的意思表示傳達給受要約人。因此，未能撤銷。
5）合同已經成立。合同成立的關鍵就是受要約人做出的承諾已經達到要約人。22日下午3時20分已經送達B公司，此時合同成立。

D. 關於國際經濟法的一道案例題

（1）有理，應支付。（2）可以，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
「天不想亮」你懂不懂啊？這是英國法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰劑案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist』s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight』s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person』s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer』s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我給你大致講一下。法官是這么說的，雖然說廣告是對不特定人提出的，一般情況下屬於要約邀請（ITT），但是本案中，被告不僅將懸賞內容寫得十分具體，而且已經把1000英鎊存進銀行，充分顯示出它願意受到該廣告內容的約束（to be bound）,所以符合了要約的根本特徵，即受約束的意思表示。所以，本案中的廣告是一個要約。而原告通過購買並使用薰劑的行為作出了行為承諾。有要約，有承諾，這個合同就成立了。
英美法教材用這個案例來說明，要約不一定要向特定人發出，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。