國際經濟法險別案例題

1. 國際經濟法案例案例分析跪求詳細答案

玉米的銷售合同，運輸合同，乙烯，丙烯的銷售合同。
2。申請。本公約適用於位於不內同國家的運營商之間的業務容。
3 NA。同樣的道理。 「合同法」都可以申請。在
4.CIF的條款翻譯為成本加保險費加運費，並在目的港當貨物越過船舷時，賣方交付。賣方的義務，以提供貨物符合合同規定，賣方必須在他自己的風險和費用取得任何出口許可證或其他官方許可，辦理海關手續，辦理所有的海關手續的貨物出口所需，賣方必須給予買方已交付貨物已按照的規定，以及任何其他通知，要求，為了讓買方受領貨物採取通常必要的措施，充分的通知。
乙烯，丙烯協議來建立的合同的風險轉移。屬於過境運輸合同的特殊規定。

2. 國際經濟法案例分析

1、貨物被燒毀的損失由中國某公司承擔，因為 CIF到岸價即"成本、保險費加運費"是指在裝運港當貨物越過船舷時賣方即完成交貨。當貨物越過船舷時賣方即完成交貨，賣方已經將貨物裝上海輪，因此損失應當有中國某公司承擔。
2、本案應當由中國某公司向保險公司索賠，理由：保險是由中國公司投保的，保險具有相對性，被保險人是中國某公司，因此應當由中國公司理賠。

3. 跪求國際經濟法案例分析答案

1.玉米買賣合同、運輸合同、乙丙買賣合同。
2.適用。該公約適用條件是營業地位於不同國家的經營者之間。
3不適用。理由同上。適用我國合同法即可。
4.CIF術語的中譯名為成本加保險費加運費，在目的港當貨物越過船舷時賣方即完成交貨。賣方義務有提供符合合同規定的貨物，賣方必須自擔風險和費用，取得任何出口許可證或其他官方許可，並在需要辦理海關手續時，辦理貨物出口貨物所需的一切海關手續，賣方必須給予買方說明貨物已按照規定交貨的充分通知，以及要求的任何其他通知，以便買方能夠為受領貨物採取通常必要的措施。
5.乙丙之間達成合意即告合同成立，風險即發生轉移。屬於在途運輸合同的特殊規定。

4. 國際經濟法案例分析。。

1、銀行有沒有拒權利付，要看受益人是否按照信用證的規定行事和交單，而本案例並未說明信用證的最遲裝運期，只是說「合同約定：...自B公司收到信用證之日起1個月內裝運。隨後，A公司於5月29日開出了符合約定的信用證」，但是沒有說B公司是於哪一天收到的信用證，因此無從判定受益人於7月3日裝運是否遲於信用證規定的裝運期。所以說本案例的銀行拒付是否有理。

那麼為了解答本案例，那麼就假設受益人遲於信用證規定的最遲裝運期裝運，如果假設成立，那麼才可以說銀行有權拒付——因為信用證是有條件的付款承諾，即受益人必須按照信用證的規定行事，包括按照信用證規定的期限裝運貨物和提交符合信用證規定的單據，否則開證行就有權拒付。那麼前面假設受益人未按期裝運，所以，開證行拒付有理。

而假設而本案例中的受益人未遲於信用證規定的裝運期裝運，那麼開證行就沒有拒付的權利。

2、「由於台風登陸，使得B公司最快到7月3日才裝船出運」，那麼，假設受益人交貨遲於信用證規定的最遲交貨期，對於信用證而言，受益人屬於違約，而其違約責任就是被開證行拒付。而對於合同而言，由於台風屬於不可抗力，那麼，因收台風影響而推遲交貨，則不算違約，因為不可抗力屬於免責條款。

3、該批貨物的價格條款為FOB，所以保險費用不包括在單價里。保險合同應由買方A公司負責訂立。

5. 國際經濟法案例分析題

1、紐約公司A向巴黎公司B采購一批物品，貨款結算方式為信用證，紐約花旗銀行2015年5月內4日開出一份信用證，編號為L/C3426。本容筆業務發票編號為95E03LC001，價值為10000.00美元，約定出票後30天付款，2015年5月13日B公司開具一張以紐約花旗銀行為付款人的遠期匯票。
（1）請根據以上內容製作一張匯票
（2）請以花旗銀行名義對這張匯票進行承兌。
（3）B公司將這張匯票背書轉讓給了法國的C公司，請幫助B公司做一個記名背書。

6. 國際經濟法案例題 求助！！！

外匯險 美國海外私人投資公司應該支付賠償

7. 關於國際經濟法的一道案例題

（1）有理，應支付。（2）可以，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
「天不想亮」你懂不懂啊？這是英國法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰劑案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist』s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight』s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person』s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer』s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我給你大致講一下。法官是這么說的，雖然說廣告是對不特定人提出的，一般情況下屬於要約邀請（ITT），但是本案中，被告不僅將懸賞內容寫得十分具體，而且已經把1000英鎊存進銀行，充分顯示出它願意受到該廣告內容的約束（to be bound）,所以符合了要約的根本特徵，即受約束的意思表示。所以，本案中的廣告是一個要約。而原告通過購買並使用薰劑的行為作出了行為承諾。有要約，有承諾，這個合同就成立了。
英美法教材用這個案例來說明，要約不一定要向特定人發出，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。

8. 案例分析題 國際經濟法 英文版

ask you teacher for answer

9. 在哪可以找到國際經濟法的案例分析題

國際經濟法案例分析題二2011年06月25日 星期六 8:43
5.甲國和乙國都是《聯合國國際貨物銷售合同公約》的締約國。甲國A公司與乙國B公司簽訂了從B公司進口l00噸白糖的合同。合同選用了《2000年國際貿易術語解釋通則》的FOB術語，並約定付款方式為托收。此後，A公司與承運人C公司簽訂了海上貨物運輸合同(運輸合同受《海牙規則》的約束)，並向D保險公司投保了平安險。艇_AB9tr希望，，號輪按時抵達乙國裝貨，B公司提供了符合合同要求的貨物。在「希望』』號輪駛向甲國目的港的途中，因遇台風使部分白糖受損。B公司委託銀行向A公司收取款項，A公司卻以貨物已經發生損失為由拒絕付款。<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

請回答下列問題：

(1)本案中的保險公司是否應對該批白糖的損失進行賠償?為什麼?

(2)本案中的承運人是否應對該批白糖的損失進行賠償?為什麼?

(3)本案白糖損失的風險在哪一方當事人?

答：

(1)本案中的保險公司不應賠償。因為本案A公司投保的是平安險，本案貨損是因為台風引起，台風屬於自然災害，本案台風引起的是貨物的部分損失，而不是全損，平安險不包括自然災害造成的部分損失，因此保險公司不承擔賠償責任，如果貨主希望得到此種情況下的賠償，應當投保水漬險，因為水漬險對自然災害引起的部分損失是賠償的。(3分)

(2)承運人也不賠。因為本案貨損是由於天災引起的，依《海牙規則》的規定，承運人對於因此而引起的貨物損失是可以免責的。(3分)

(3)由於本案選用了FOB術語，貨物的風險是在裝貨港船舷轉移的，因此途中的風險是由買方承擔的，即風險由A公司承擔。(4分)

6.美國A公司與我國B公司簽訂了購買一批月餅的合同，交貨日期為當年0eNT-前--N期，以便賣給在美國的華人過中秋節之用。但是，由於我國當年中秋節月餅市場火爆，B公司貨源緊張，中秋節已過了一個星期還未交貨。而美國的實際情況是由於中秋節已過，月餅難以銷售。A公司於是通知B公司宣告合同無效。

問：(1)A公司宣告合同無效是否有法律依據?

(2)A、B兩公司約定在中國國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會仲裁，哪一方有可能敗訴?如果敗訴方不履行仲裁裁決，另一方當事人應怎樣做

答：

(1)A公司宣告合同無效的依據是B公司的行為構成根本違約。B公司延遲交貨，就是違約行為。而且由於中秋月餅是在特定時間銷售的物品，B公司延遲交貨，A公司賣出月餅就很困難，由此會蒙受損失，以至於實際上剝奪了A公司根據合同所期待得到的利益，即B公司的延遲交貨構成根本違反合同。B公司根本違反合同，A公司應有權宣告合同無效，可向B公司主張損害賠償。(5分)

(2)由於B公司根本違反合同，B公司會敗訴。B公司不履行仲裁裁決，A公司可以根據法律的規定，向中國法院申請執行。(5分)

7.2004年5月8日，一中國公司與一韓國公司簽訂合同訂購電子零部件5萬套，FCA(韓國某港口)價格條件，2004年11月7日～9日交貨，合同適用《聯合國國際貨物買賣合同公約》，若發生合同爭議，由中國國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會仲裁解決。後由於此類電子產品價格下跌，同年6月20日，中國公司與韓國公司將訂貨變更為4萬套，產品價格不變。2004年11月8日，韓國公司將貨物交給中國公司指定的承運人。ll月25日，中國公司收到貨物，發現韓國公司所|交貨物仍然是5萬套。

問：(1)FCA的中文名稱是什麼?本案中，貨物風險何時由韓國公司轉移給中國公司?

(2)中國公司ll月25日才收到貨物，能否以韓國公司未按期交貨為由追究其違約責任?

(3)中國公司能否按市場價收取多交的1萬套電子部件?

(4)若其中有l．5萬套產品不合格，中國公司想向韓國公司退換不合格產品，則在實際退回韓國公司前，中國公司應該對該部分產品採取何種措施?有關費用應由誰承擔?

(5)若雙方糾紛經仲裁後，韓國公司拒不執行已生效的仲裁裁決，中國公司如何使裁決在韓國得到執行?法律依據是什麼?

參考答案：

(1)FCA為貨交承運人。本案中貨物風險從2004年11月8日韓國公司將貨物交給中國公司指定的承運人時起風險轉移。(2分)

(2)不能，因為韓國公司已在規定的交貨期內交付貨物。

(3)中國公司可以按市場價收取多交的1萬套電子部件。(2分)

(4)保全貨物，費用由韓國公司承擔。(2分)

(5)依照《紐約公約》使裁決在韓國得到執行。