国际经济法形考案列题

㈠ 求法律专业高手帮答国际经济法案例分析题，题目如下。

我不专业~做着玩~跟你探讨下~
1，火鸡可以解除合同~（根本违约）专
只要在合同构属成根本违约则可以解除合同，根本违约公约第二十五条：“一方当事人违反合同的结果，如使另一方当事人蒙受损害，以致于实际上剥夺了他根据合同规定有权期待得到的东西，即为根本违反合同，除非违反合同一方并不预知而且一个同等资格、通情达理的人处于相同情况中也没有理由预知会发生这种结果。”
故第二种不是根本违约
2，承运人~原因：清洁提单的签发责任~
3，b构成反要约~合同未成立

㈡ 关于国际经济法的一道案例题

（1）有理，应支付。（2）可以，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
“天不想亮”你懂不懂啊？这是英国法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰剂案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist’s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight’s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person’s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer’s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我给你大致讲一下。法官是这么说的，虽然说广告是对不特定人提出的，一般情况下属于要约邀请（ITT），但是本案中，被告不仅将悬赏内容写得十分具体，而且已经把1000英镑存进银行，充分显示出它愿意受到该广告内容的约束（to be bound）,所以符合了要约的根本特征，即受约束的意思表示。所以，本案中的广告是一个要约。而原告通过购买并使用薰剂的行为作出了行为承诺。有要约，有承诺，这个合同就成立了。
英美法教材用这个案例来说明，要约不一定要向特定人发出，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。

㈢ 求：国际经济法案例分析题

这是我自己的解答：
1.提单具有三个法律性质。一，提单是托运人与承运人之间国际海上货物运输合同的证明（evidence）;二，提单是承运人接管货物或货物装船的收据（receipt）。提单是承运人保证向收货人交付货物的物权凭证（title）。
2.承运人应该负责。因为本案例中承运人签发的是倒签提单，有欺诈之嫌。托运人的保函尽在托运人与承运人之间有效。承运人签发了提单却不能按约定交货就必须承担损害赔偿责任，淡然承运人可凭保函的效力向托运人追偿。

㈣ 国际经济法案例分析题

1、纽约公司A向巴黎公司B采购一批物品，货款结算方式为信用证，纽约花旗银行2015年5月内4日开出一份信用证，编号为L/C3426。本容笔业务发票编号为95E03LC001，价值为10000.00美元，约定出票后30天付款，2015年5月13日B公司开具一张以纽约花旗银行为付款人的远期汇票。
（1）请根据以上内容制作一张汇票
（2）请以花旗银行名义对这张汇票进行承兑。
（3）B公司将这张汇票背书转让给了法国的C公司，请帮助B公司做一个记名背书。

㈤ 跪求国际经济法案例分析答案

1.玉米买卖合同、运输合同、乙丙买卖合同。
2.适用。该公约适用条件是营业地位于不同国家的经营者之间。
3不适用。理由同上。适用我国合同法即可。
4.CIF术语的中译名为成本加保险费加运费，在目的港当货物越过船舷时卖方即完成交货。卖方义务有提供符合合同规定的货物，卖方必须自担风险和费用，取得任何出口许可证或其他官方许可，并在需要办理海关手续时，办理货物出口货物所需的一切海关手续，卖方必须给予买方说明货物已按照规定交货的充分通知，以及要求的任何其他通知，以便买方能够为受领货物采取通常必要的措施。
5.乙丙之间达成合意即告合同成立，风险即发生转移。属于在途运输合同的特殊规定。

㈥ 国际经济法例分析题

国际经济法是指调整国家之间；国际组织之间；国家与国际组织之间；国家与内他国私人之间；国际组织容与私人之间以及不同国籍私人之间，相互经济关系的法律规范的总称。它是随着各国之间贸易和经济往来日益增长以及国家对贸易和经济活动的干预日益加强而形成和发展的。早在中世纪末期，欧洲主要商业城市就有一些关于国际商业交易的规则。第二次世界大战后，有关国际经济关系的法律规则和制度大量出现，并具有了国家之间条约的形式。作为一门学科，国际经济法学也于第二次世界大战后，逐渐发展起来。国际经济法调整的是广义的国际经济关系，那么它必然既包括国际法规范，也包括国内法规范；既包括公法，也包括私法。在经济全球化加快的背景下，国际经济关系、国际经济秩序和国际经济法的发展和更改，是在南北矛盾—交锋—磋商—妥协—合作—协调—新的矛盾中曲折行进的。如何扩大和加强众多发展中国家对世界经济事务的发言权、参与权和决策权，把有关的“国际游戏规则”或行为规范制定得更加公平合理，从而更能促进建立起公平、公正、合理的国际经济新秩序。面临这一客观需求，国际经济法正在发生新的变化。

㈦ 国际经济法案例分析题 跪求！！！

1）要约人抄是香港A商。受要约人袭是上海B公司。
2）3）自己看概念
4）A公司未成功撤销自己的发盘。撤销要件之一必须在受要约人作出承诺以前到达被要约人。事实上当他向香港电报局交发电报之前，B公司已经向上海电报局交发了对上述发盘接受的电报。未在受要约人承诺之前将撤销的意思表示传达给受要约人。因此，未能撤销。
5）合同已经成立。合同成立的关键就是受要约人做出的承诺已经达到要约人。22日下午3时20分已经送达B公司，此时合同成立。