国际经济法的小麦案例

① 国际经济法案例，麻烦给看看！

1。成立，甲公司发出的要约为附期限的要约，为不可撤销的，甲、乙双方均不可撤版销。就是说在权期限时间内答复均属合同成立。
2。成立，乙公司的复电属于承诺，甲方不用答复，找乙方承诺合同成立
3。成立，两个月内不答复视为接受订单，已经是两人长期以来的订立合同的惯例，所以甲方在收到订单时没有回复，可以按照习惯推定为合同成立
4。不成立，但是乙方应该赔偿甲方的损失，因为乙方违约 在先（这道题我也不太清楚，拿不准）

② 国际经济法的一道案例题

（1）有理，应支付。（2）可以，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
“天不想亮”你懂不懂啊？这是英国法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰剂案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist’s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight’s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person’s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer’s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我给你大致讲一下。法官是这么说的，虽然说广告是对不特定人提出的，一般情况下属于要约邀请（ITT），但是本案中，被告不仅将悬赏内容写得十分具体，而且已经把1000英镑存进银行，充分显示出它愿意受到该广告内容的约束（to be bound）,所以符合了要约的根本特征，即受约束的意思表示。所以，本案中的广告是一个要约。而原告通过购买并使用薰剂的行为作出了行为承诺。有要约，有承诺，这个合同就成立了。
英美法教材用这个案例来说明，要约不一定要向特定人发出，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
打字不易，如满意，望采纳。

③ 国际经济法 案例分析

案例分析如下
2001年12月，中国深圳某公司与德国一公司签订了6万箱 芦笋罐头出口合同，合同约定：1. 价格条件为FOB青岛；目的地为汉堡；装船时间为2002年6月；2. 深圳公司负责联系船舶，德公司开立以深圳公司为收益人的不可撤销信用证。合同签订后，深圳公司依约备好货物，德国公司也开立了信用证。但由于船舶紧张，深圳公司联系不到运输船舶，于是致函德公司要求派船；并称：根据《 Incoterms2000》，FOB条件下，作为买方的德公司应自己来订立 货物运输合同并承担其费用。德公司回复：双方合同并未约定适用《Incoterms2000》退一步讲，即使适用，由于合同已明确约定深圳公司负责船舶事宜，这一约定应优先于Incoterms2000，深圳公司必须根据合同履行联系船舶义务。双方因而发生争议，致合同未能履行。双方均要求对方承担 违约责任。
问题： （1）本案是否适用《 联合国国际销售合同公约》？为什么？
（2）Incoterms2000可否适用于本案？为什么？
（3）双方之间联系运输船舶的责任应由谁承担?为什么？

答案：
1、适用。合同双方没有排除公约的适用，则公约自动适用于他们之间的买卖合同。
2、适用。Incoterms2000是国际惯例，双方选择了FOB，意味着双方的合同适用通则。 3、按FOB，应由德国公司负责安排运输，但合同双方可以对其项下的内容进行不同的约定。从题中所述，双方合同中已明确约定由深圳公司负责安排运输，则这个约定是有效的，应该由深圳公司联系运输船舶。

④ 国际经济法学案例分析

这涉及到国际贸易以及国际经济法方面的知识：

CIF术语的中译名为成本加保险费加运费，（指定目的港，其原文为Cost,Insurance and Freight(...named port of desti-nation)按此术语成交，货价的构成因素中包括从装运港至约定目的地港的通常运费和约定的保险费，故卖方除具有与CFR术语的相同的义务外，还就为买方办理货运保险，交支付保险费，按一般国际贸易惯例，卖方投保的保险金额应按CIF价加成10%。如买卖双方未约定具体险别，则卖方只需取得最低限底的保险险别，如买方要求加保战争险，在保险费由买方负担的前提下，卖方应予加保，卖方投保时，如能办到，应以合同货币投保。 需要强调指出的是，按CIF术语成交，虽然由卖方安排货物运输和办理货运保险，但卖方并不承担保证把货送到约定目的港的义务，因为CIF是属于装运交货的术语，而不是目的港交货的术语，也就是说CIF不是“到岸价” 。
（一）
1、该合同于8月19日生效。中国A公司于8月19日电报通知对方同意其要求时，根据《合同法》，此时合同生效。
2、该批货物运输保险费用应当由中国A公司承担，因为合同中签订的贸易术语是CIF方式交货。
3、自离开上海港前，风险由A公司承担。离开上海港至美国纽约港期间，风险转移，由卖方承担。
4、不可以。在CIF贸易术语下，买方只是承担保险费，但货物离开上海港后风险转移到卖方
5、A公司。
（二）
不能。理由同上，由买方向保险公司索赔。不过卖方可以积极配合。

（如果采纳，本人急需分啊）

⑤ 国际经济法案例求答案

1.（1）2.（1）3.（2）4.（1）5.（3）6.（3）7.（2）8.（1）9.（2）

⑥ 急求一下国际经济法案例的答案 谢谢

案例一：
1、因为A公司是卖家，且以CIF价格成交，所以，应由A公司与承运人C订立运输合内同。容
2、应有A公司向保险公司投保并交纳保险费用。
3、A公司的交货地点在天津港。
4、货物运输的风险在天津港货物越过船舷时起由卖方转移给买方。
5、1,500公斤大米由于灌水灭火受损和拖船厂费用属于共同海损。

案例二：
1、应由瑞士迪高谷物有限公司负责与承运人订立运输合同。由粮油公司负责投保海上货物运输保险。
2、粮油公司的货物短量、变质等的损失应由保险公司承担。因为粮油公司向保险公司投保了一切险和战争险，包括短量险，所以货物短量、变质等的损失应由保险公司承担。
3、本案中货物的损失有208.941公吨的短量和发红变质的货物4,927.389公吨。粮油公司可以直接向保险公司索赔。
4、保险公司在赔付了粮油公司后，能取得代位权，即由此取得了对责任方追索的权力。
5、依据我国现行法律的规定，保险公司可以向承运人行使这一权利。

⑦ 国际经济法案例分析

产生和发展
国际经济法的产生和发展 国际经济法，是泛指调整国际经济关系的各种法律规范。它是调整国际经济关系的各法律规范的总称。 何谓国际经济关系？学者界说可分为两大类。一说认为国际经济关系专指国家政府之间、国际组织之间或国家政府与国际组织之间由于经济交往而产生的各种关系；其主体，限于国家、国际组织以及在国际公法上具有独立人格的其他实体。另一说则认为国际经济关系不仅包含上述内容，而且包含属于不同国家的个人之间、法人之间、个人与法人之间以及他们与异国政府或国际组织之间由于经济交往而产生的各种关系；其主体，包括在国际民商法、国际私法上具有独立人格的个人或组织，即属于不同国家的国民个人（自然人）及各种法人。 国际经济法，就其广义的内涵而言，是各国统治阶级在国际经济交往方面协调意志或个别意志的表现。各国的统治阶级为了自身的利益，总是尽力把自己所需要的各种秩序建立起来和固定下来，使它具有拘束力、强制力，于是就出现了各种法律规范。法律就是秩序创建的固定化和强制化。法律与秩序两者之间的这种密切关系，是具有普遍性的。为维护各个历史时期的国际经济秩序制订了具有一定约束力或强制性的国际经济行为规范，即国际经济法。它是巩固现存国际经济秩序的重要工具，也是促进变革旧国际经济秩序、建立新国际经济秩序的重要手段 衡诸历史事实，上述第二种见解是可以接受的。迄今为止 ，国际经济法经历了萌芽、发展、转折更新三大阶段，而每一个大阶段又可划分为若干个时期。

⑧ 国际经济法案例分析。。

1、银行有没有拒权利付，要看受益人是否按照信用证的规定行事和交单，而本案例并未说明信用证的最迟装运期，只是说“合同约定：...自B公司收到信用证之日起1个月内装运。随后，A公司于5月29日开出了符合约定的信用证”，但是没有说B公司是于哪一天收到的信用证，因此无从判定受益人于7月3日装运是否迟于信用证规定的装运期。所以说本案例的银行拒付是否有理。

那么为了解答本案例，那么就假设受益人迟于信用证规定的最迟装运期装运，如果假设成立，那么才可以说银行有权拒付——因为信用证是有条件的付款承诺，即受益人必须按照信用证的规定行事，包括按照信用证规定的期限装运货物和提交符合信用证规定的单据，否则开证行就有权拒付。那么前面假设受益人未按期装运，所以，开证行拒付有理。

而假设而本案例中的受益人未迟于信用证规定的装运期装运，那么开证行就没有拒付的权利。

2、“由于台风登陆，使得B公司最快到7月3日才装船出运”，那么，假设受益人交货迟于信用证规定的最迟交货期，对于信用证而言，受益人属于违约，而其违约责任就是被开证行拒付。而对于合同而言，由于台风属于不可抗力，那么，因收台风影响而推迟交货，则不算违约，因为不可抗力属于免责条款。

3、该批货物的价格条款为FOB，所以保险费用不包括在单价里。保险合同应由买方A公司负责订立。

⑨ 国际经济法案例分析 高分求详解

1、法律是否适用，要看合同的约定；
2、卖方在旧金山货交承运人，完成交货；
3、卖方无权以此理由拒绝履约，因为并无实际证据；
4、开证行付款的条件是看单单相符、单证相符，只审查单据表面相符，就要付款。

⑩ 国际经济法案例分析题

1、纽约公司A向巴黎公司B采购一批物品，货款结算方式为信用证，纽约花旗银行2015年5月内4日开出一份信用证，编号为L/C3426。本容笔业务发票编号为95E03LC001，价值为10000.00美元，约定出票后30天付款，2015年5月13日B公司开具一张以纽约花旗银行为付款人的远期汇票。
（1）请根据以上内容制作一张汇票
（2）请以花旗银行名义对这张汇票进行承兑。
（3）B公司将这张汇票背书转让给了法国的C公司，请帮助B公司做一个记名背书。