国际经济法02任务0020

A. 跪求国际经济法案例分析答案

1.CISG的使用标准是营业地标准，股本合同争议可以适用。
2.2月20日成立。因为CISG采到达主义，承诺到内达对方容是合同成立。
3.不能，因为CIF的风险转移制度规定只要货物交付给承运人，所有货物的一切损失都由买方承担，除非货物的这种损害或缺陷是因为卖方的原因引起的。本题中是因为承运人的疏忽而导致货物的灭失，与托运人无关。
4.均有卖方即中国A公司，可以，因为保险的受益人是买方。
5.承担责任，因为不属于免责的范围之内。要对买方即美国B公司。
6.不可以，信用证支付方式是准村的单证交易，实际货物的交易状况不能影响信用证货款的交付。

不知道这样回答您满意吗？

B. 国际经济法,急!

合同双方合意不违返法律法规都可以，采用这种方式，不是很有利于卖方就是了！
首先解释一下，CIF(成本+运费+保险)
COST,INSURANCE AND FREIGHT(…named port of destination)--成本加保险费、运费（…指定目的港）是指卖方必须在合同规定的装运期内在装运港将货物交至运往指定目的港的船上，负担货物越过船舷为止的一切费用和货物灭失或损坏的风险，并负责办理货运保险，支付保险费，以及负责租船或订舱，支付从装运港到目的港的运费。

按照《1990年通则》，CIF合同买卖双方的主要义务如下：

（一） 卖方的主要义务

1． 负责在合同规定的日期或期间内，在装运港将符合合同的货物交至运往指定目的港的船上，并给予买方充分的通知；

2． 负责办理货物出口手续，取得出口许可证或其他核准书；

3． 负责租船或订舱，并支付至目的港的运费；

4． 负责办理货物运输保险，支付保险费；

5． 负担货物在装运港越过船舷为止的一切费用和风险；

6． 负责提供商业发票，保险单和货物运往约定目的港的通常运输单据。如果买卖双方约定采用电子通信，则所有单据可被具有同等效力的电子数据交换信息所替代。

（二） 买方的主要义务

1． 负责按合同规定支付价款；

2． 负责办理货物进口手续，取得进口许可证或其他核准书；

3． 负担货物在装运港越过船舷后的一切费用和风险；

4． 收取卖方按合同规定交付的货物，接受与合同相符的单据。

在采用CIF术语时，需注意以下几点：

1. CIF合同属"装运合同"，尽管我们通常称之为"到岸价"，但这是指价格的构成，是由成本运费+保险费。而不是指卖方也负责货物到岸前的风险。卖方在按合同规定的装运地将货物交付装运后，对货物可能发生的任何风险不再承担责任。

2. 卖方应及时租船订舱。

3. 卖方应按合同要求办理保险，有关保险责任的起讫期限必须与货物运输相符合，并必须至迟自买方需负担货物灭失或损坏的风险时（即自货物在装运港越过船舷时）起对买方的保障生效。该保险责任的期限必须展延至货物到达约定的目的港为止。

4. 卸货费用的负担，常用CIF术语的变形来表示，例如：

2 CIF班轮条件（CIF liner terms），指卸货费用按班轮条件处理，由支付运费的一方（即卖方）负担；

2 CIF舱底交货（CIF ex ship's hold），指买方负担将货物从舱底起吊卸到码头的费用；

2 CIF吊钩交货（CIF ex tackle），指卖方负担将货物从舱底吊至船边卸离吊钩为止的费用；

2 CIF卸到岸上（CIF landed），指卖方负担将货物卸到目的港岸上的费用。

5.CIF合同属于象征性交货(symbolic delivery)合同。卖方只提交符合合同要求的单据，即等同于交付货物，即使在卖方提交单据时，货物已经灭失或损坏，买方仍必须凭单据付款，但他可凭提单向船方或凭保险单向保险公司要求赔偿。

再解释一下，水渍险
水渍险的责任范围除了包括“平安险”的各项责任外，还负责被保险货物由于恶劣气候、雷电、海啸、地震、洪水等自然灾害所造成的部分损失。
平安险这一名称在我国保行业中沿用甚久。人其英文原意是指单独海损不负责赔偿。根据国际保险界对单独海损的解释，它是指部分损失。因此，平安险的原来保障范围只赔全部损失。但在长期实践的过程中对平安险的责任范围进行了补么和修订，当前平安险的责任范围已经超出只赔全损的限制。概括起来，这一险别的责任范围主要包括：

a. 运输过程中，由于自然灾害和运输工具发生意外事件，民被保险货物的实物的实际全损或推定全损。

B. 由于运输工具遭搁浅、触礁、沉没、互撞。与流一其他物体碰撞以及失火、爆炸等意外事故造成被保险货物的部分损失。

C. 只要运输工具曾经发生搁浅、触礁、沉没、焚毁等意外事故，不论这意个事故发生之前或者以后曾在海上遭恶劣气候、雷电、海啸等自然灾害所造成的被保险货物的部分损失。

D. 在装卸转船过程中，被保险货物一件或数件落海所造成的全部损失或部分损失。

E. 运输工具遭自然灾害或意外事故，在避难港卸货所引起被保险货物的全部损失或部分损失。

F. 运输工具遭自然或灾害或意外事故，需要在中途的港口或者在避难港口停靠，因而引起的卸货、装货、存仓以及运送货物所产生的特别费用。

G. 发生共同海损所引起的牺牲、公摊费和救助费用。

H. 发生了保险责任范围内的危险，被保险人对货物采取抢求、防止或少损失的各种措施，因而产生合理施遇用。但是保险公司承担费用的限额不能超过这批被救货物的保险金额。施救费用可以在赔款金额以外的一个保险金额限度内承担。

C. 国际经济法案例分析题 跪求！！！

1）要约人抄是香港A商。受要约人袭是上海B公司。
2）3）自己看概念
4）A公司未成功撤销自己的发盘。撤销要件之一必须在受要约人作出承诺以前到达被要约人。事实上当他向香港电报局交发电报之前，B公司已经向上海电报局交发了对上述发盘接受的电报。未在受要约人承诺之前将撤销的意思表示传达给受要约人。因此，未能撤销。
5）合同已经成立。合同成立的关键就是受要约人做出的承诺已经达到要约人。22日下午3时20分已经送达B公司，此时合同成立。

D. 关于国际经济法的一道案例题

（1）有理，应支付。（2）可以，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
“天不想亮”你懂不懂啊？这是英国法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰剂案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist’s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight’s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person’s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer’s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我给你大致讲一下。法官是这么说的，虽然说广告是对不特定人提出的，一般情况下属于要约邀请（ITT），但是本案中，被告不仅将悬赏内容写得十分具体，而且已经把1000英镑存进银行，充分显示出它愿意受到该广告内容的约束（to be bound）,所以符合了要约的根本特征，即受约束的意思表示。所以，本案中的广告是一个要约。而原告通过购买并使用薰剂的行为作出了行为承诺。有要约，有承诺，这个合同就成立了。
英美法教材用这个案例来说明，要约不一定要向特定人发出，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。