国际经济法险别案例题

1. 国际经济法案例案例分析跪求详细答案

玉米的销售合同，运输合同，乙烯，丙烯的销售合同。
2。申请。本公约适用于位于不内同国家的运营商之间的业务容。
3 NA。同样的道理。 “合同法”都可以申请。在
4.CIF的条款翻译为成本加保险费加运费，并在目的港当货物越过船舷时，卖方交付。卖方的义务，以提供货物符合合同规定，卖方必须在他自己的风险和费用取得任何出口许可证或其他官方许可，办理海关手续，办理所有的海关手续的货物出口所需，卖方必须给予买方已交付货物已按照的规定，以及任何其他通知，要求，为了让买方受领货物采取通常必要的措施，充分的通知。
乙烯，丙烯协议来建立的合同的风险转移。属于过境运输合同的特殊规定。

2. 国际经济法案例分析

1、货物被烧毁的损失由中国某公司承担，因为 CIF到岸价即"成本、保险费加运费"是指在装运港当货物越过船舷时卖方即完成交货。当货物越过船舷时卖方即完成交货，卖方已经将货物装上海轮，因此损失应当有中国某公司承担。
2、本案应当由中国某公司向保险公司索赔，理由：保险是由中国公司投保的，保险具有相对性，被保险人是中国某公司，因此应当由中国公司理赔。

3. 跪求国际经济法案例分析答案

1.玉米买卖合同、运输合同、乙丙买卖合同。
2.适用。该公约适用条件是营业地位于不同国家的经营者之间。
3不适用。理由同上。适用我国合同法即可。
4.CIF术语的中译名为成本加保险费加运费，在目的港当货物越过船舷时卖方即完成交货。卖方义务有提供符合合同规定的货物，卖方必须自担风险和费用，取得任何出口许可证或其他官方许可，并在需要办理海关手续时，办理货物出口货物所需的一切海关手续，卖方必须给予买方说明货物已按照规定交货的充分通知，以及要求的任何其他通知，以便买方能够为受领货物采取通常必要的措施。
5.乙丙之间达成合意即告合同成立，风险即发生转移。属于在途运输合同的特殊规定。

4. 国际经济法案例分析。。

1、银行有没有拒权利付，要看受益人是否按照信用证的规定行事和交单，而本案例并未说明信用证的最迟装运期，只是说“合同约定：...自B公司收到信用证之日起1个月内装运。随后，A公司于5月29日开出了符合约定的信用证”，但是没有说B公司是于哪一天收到的信用证，因此无从判定受益人于7月3日装运是否迟于信用证规定的装运期。所以说本案例的银行拒付是否有理。

那么为了解答本案例，那么就假设受益人迟于信用证规定的最迟装运期装运，如果假设成立，那么才可以说银行有权拒付——因为信用证是有条件的付款承诺，即受益人必须按照信用证的规定行事，包括按照信用证规定的期限装运货物和提交符合信用证规定的单据，否则开证行就有权拒付。那么前面假设受益人未按期装运，所以，开证行拒付有理。

而假设而本案例中的受益人未迟于信用证规定的装运期装运，那么开证行就没有拒付的权利。

2、“由于台风登陆，使得B公司最快到7月3日才装船出运”，那么，假设受益人交货迟于信用证规定的最迟交货期，对于信用证而言，受益人属于违约，而其违约责任就是被开证行拒付。而对于合同而言，由于台风属于不可抗力，那么，因收台风影响而推迟交货，则不算违约，因为不可抗力属于免责条款。

3、该批货物的价格条款为FOB，所以保险费用不包括在单价里。保险合同应由买方A公司负责订立。

5. 国际经济法案例分析题

1、纽约公司A向巴黎公司B采购一批物品，货款结算方式为信用证，纽约花旗银行2015年5月内4日开出一份信用证，编号为L/C3426。本容笔业务发票编号为95E03LC001，价值为10000.00美元，约定出票后30天付款，2015年5月13日B公司开具一张以纽约花旗银行为付款人的远期汇票。
（1）请根据以上内容制作一张汇票
（2）请以花旗银行名义对这张汇票进行承兑。
（3）B公司将这张汇票背书转让给了法国的C公司，请帮助B公司做一个记名背书。

6. 国际经济法案例题 求助！！！

外汇险 美国海外私人投资公司应该支付赔偿

7. 关于国际经济法的一道案例题

（1）有理，应支付。（2）可以，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。
“天不想亮”你懂不懂啊？这是英国法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰剂案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist’s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight’s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person’s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer’s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我给你大致讲一下。法官是这么说的，虽然说广告是对不特定人提出的，一般情况下属于要约邀请（ITT），但是本案中，被告不仅将悬赏内容写得十分具体，而且已经把1000英镑存进银行，充分显示出它愿意受到该广告内容的约束（to be bound）,所以符合了要约的根本特征，即受约束的意思表示。所以，本案中的广告是一个要约。而原告通过购买并使用薰剂的行为作出了行为承诺。有要约，有承诺，这个合同就成立了。
英美法教材用这个案例来说明，要约不一定要向特定人发出，只要有明确的受约束的意思表示即可。

8. 案例分析题 国际经济法 英文版

ask you teacher for answer

9. 在哪可以找到国际经济法的案例分析题

国际经济法案例分析题二2011年06月25日 星期六 8:43
5.甲国和乙国都是《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的缔约国。甲国A公司与乙国B公司签订了从B公司进口l00吨白糖的合同。合同选用了《2000年国际贸易术语解释通则》的FOB术语，并约定付款方式为托收。此后，A公司与承运人C公司签订了海上货物运输合同(运输合同受《海牙规则》的约束)，并向D保险公司投保了平安险。艇_AB9tr希望，，号轮按时抵达乙国装货，B公司提供了符合合同要求的货物。在“希望’’号轮驶向甲国目的港的途中，因遇台风使部分白糖受损。B公司委托银行向A公司收取款项，A公司却以货物已经发生损失为由拒绝付款。<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

请回答下列问题：

(1)本案中的保险公司是否应对该批白糖的损失进行赔偿?为什么?

(2)本案中的承运人是否应对该批白糖的损失进行赔偿?为什么?

(3)本案白糖损失的风险在哪一方当事人?

答：

(1)本案中的保险公司不应赔偿。因为本案A公司投保的是平安险，本案货损是因为台风引起，台风属于自然灾害，本案台风引起的是货物的部分损失，而不是全损，平安险不包括自然灾害造成的部分损失，因此保险公司不承担赔偿责任，如果货主希望得到此种情况下的赔偿，应当投保水渍险，因为水渍险对自然灾害引起的部分损失是赔偿的。(3分)

(2)承运人也不赔。因为本案货损是由于天灾引起的，依《海牙规则》的规定，承运人对于因此而引起的货物损失是可以免责的。(3分)

(3)由于本案选用了FOB术语，货物的风险是在装货港船舷转移的，因此途中的风险是由买方承担的，即风险由A公司承担。(4分)

6.美国A公司与我国B公司签订了购买一批月饼的合同，交货日期为当年0eNT-前--N期，以便卖给在美国的华人过中秋节之用。但是，由于我国当年中秋节月饼市场火爆，B公司货源紧张，中秋节已过了一个星期还未交货。而美国的实际情况是由于中秋节已过，月饼难以销售。A公司于是通知B公司宣告合同无效。

问：(1)A公司宣告合同无效是否有法律依据?

(2)A、B两公司约定在中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁，哪一方有可能败诉?如果败诉方不履行仲裁裁决，另一方当事人应怎样做

答：

(1)A公司宣告合同无效的依据是B公司的行为构成根本违约。B公司延迟交货，就是违约行为。而且由于中秋月饼是在特定时间销售的物品，B公司延迟交货，A公司卖出月饼就很困难，由此会蒙受损失，以至于实际上剥夺了A公司根据合同所期待得到的利益，即B公司的延迟交货构成根本违反合同。B公司根本违反合同，A公司应有权宣告合同无效，可向B公司主张损害赔偿。(5分)

(2)由于B公司根本违反合同，B公司会败诉。B公司不履行仲裁裁决，A公司可以根据法律的规定，向中国法院申请执行。(5分)

7.2004年5月8日，一中国公司与一韩国公司签订合同订购电子零部件5万套，FCA(韩国某港口)价格条件，2004年11月7日～9日交货，合同适用《联合国国际货物买卖合同公约》，若发生合同争议，由中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁解决。后由于此类电子产品价格下跌，同年6月20日，中国公司与韩国公司将订货变更为4万套，产品价格不变。2004年11月8日，韩国公司将货物交给中国公司指定的承运人。ll月25日，中国公司收到货物，发现韩国公司所|交货物仍然是5万套。

问：(1)FCA的中文名称是什么?本案中，货物风险何时由韩国公司转移给中国公司?

(2)中国公司ll月25日才收到货物，能否以韩国公司未按期交货为由追究其违约责任?

(3)中国公司能否按市场价收取多交的1万套电子部件?

(4)若其中有l．5万套产品不合格，中国公司想向韩国公司退换不合格产品，则在实际退回韩国公司前，中国公司应该对该部分产品采取何种措施?有关费用应由谁承担?

(5)若双方纠纷经仲裁后，韩国公司拒不执行已生效的仲裁裁决，中国公司如何使裁决在韩国得到执行?法律依据是什么?

参考答案：

(1)FCA为货交承运人。本案中货物风险从2004年11月8日韩国公司将货物交给中国公司指定的承运人时起风险转移。(2分)

(2)不能，因为韩国公司已在规定的交货期内交付货物。

(3)中国公司可以按市场价收取多交的1万套电子部件。(2分)

(4)保全货物，费用由韩国公司承担。(2分)

(5)依照《纽约公约》使裁决在韩国得到执行。