國際經濟法的小麥案例

① 國際經濟法案例，麻煩給看看！

1。成立，甲公司發出的要約為附期限的要約，為不可撤銷的，甲、乙雙方均不可撤版銷。就是說在權期限時間內答復均屬合同成立。
2。成立，乙公司的復電屬於承諾，甲方不用答復，找乙方承諾合同成立
3。成立，兩個月內不答復視為接受訂單，已經是兩人長期以來的訂立合同的慣例，所以甲方在收到訂單時沒有回復，可以按照習慣推定為合同成立
4。不成立，但是乙方應該賠償甲方的損失，因為乙方違約 在先（這道題我也不太清楚，拿不準）

② 國際經濟法的一道案例題

（1）有理，應支付。（2）可以，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
「天不想亮」你懂不懂啊？這是英國法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰劑案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist』s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight』s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person』s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer』s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我給你大致講一下。法官是這么說的，雖然說廣告是對不特定人提出的，一般情況下屬於要約邀請（ITT），但是本案中，被告不僅將懸賞內容寫得十分具體，而且已經把1000英鎊存進銀行，充分顯示出它願意受到該廣告內容的約束（to be bound）,所以符合了要約的根本特徵，即受約束的意思表示。所以，本案中的廣告是一個要約。而原告通過購買並使用薰劑的行為作出了行為承諾。有要約，有承諾，這個合同就成立了。
英美法教材用這個案例來說明，要約不一定要向特定人發出，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
打字不易，如滿意，望採納。

③ 國際經濟法 案例分析

案例分析如下
2001年12月，中國深圳某公司與德國一公司簽訂了6萬箱 蘆筍罐頭出口合同，合同約定：1. 價格條件為FOB青島；目的地為漢堡；裝船時間為2002年6月；2. 深圳公司負責聯系船舶，德公司開立以深圳公司為收益人的不可撤銷信用證。合同簽訂後，深圳公司依約備好貨物，德國公司也開立了信用證。但由於船舶緊張，深圳公司聯系不到運輸船舶，於是致函德公司要求派船；並稱：根據《 Incoterms2000》，FOB條件下，作為買方的德公司應自己來訂立 貨物運輸合同並承擔其費用。德公司回復：雙方合同並未約定適用《Incoterms2000》退一步講，即使適用，由於合同已明確約定深圳公司負責船舶事宜，這一約定應優先於Incoterms2000，深圳公司必須根據合同履行聯系船舶義務。雙方因而發生爭議，致合同未能履行。雙方均要求對方承擔 違約責任。
問題： （1）本案是否適用《 聯合國國際銷售合同公約》？為什麼？
（2）Incoterms2000可否適用於本案？為什麼？
（3）雙方之間聯系運輸船舶的責任應由誰承擔?為什麼？

答案：
1、適用。合同雙方沒有排除公約的適用，則公約自動適用於他們之間的買賣合同。
2、適用。Incoterms2000是國際慣例，雙方選擇了FOB，意味著雙方的合同適用通則。 3、按FOB，應由德國公司負責安排運輸，但合同雙方可以對其項下的內容進行不同的約定。從題中所述，雙方合同中已明確約定由深圳公司負責安排運輸，則這個約定是有效的，應該由深圳公司聯系運輸船舶。

④ 國際經濟法學案例分析

這涉及到國際貿易以及國際經濟法方面的知識：

CIF術語的中譯名為成本加保險費加運費，（指定目的港，其原文為Cost,Insurance and Freight(...named port of desti-nation)按此術語成交，貨價的構成因素中包括從裝運港至約定目的地港的通常運費和約定的保險費，故賣方除具有與CFR術語的相同的義務外，還就為買方辦理貨運保險，交支付保險費，按一般國際貿易慣例，賣方投保的保險金額應按CIF價加成10%。如買賣雙方未約定具體險別，則賣方只需取得最低限底的保險險別，如買方要求加保戰爭險，在保險費由買方負擔的前提下，賣方應予加保，賣方投保時，如能辦到，應以合同貨幣投保。 需要強調指出的是，按CIF術語成交，雖然由賣方安排貨物運輸和辦理貨運保險，但賣方並不承擔保證把貨送到約定目的港的義務，因為CIF是屬於裝運交貨的術語，而不是目的港交貨的術語，也就是說CIF不是「到岸價」 。
（一）
1、該合同於8月19日生效。中國A公司於8月19日電報通知對方同意其要求時，根據《合同法》，此時合同生效。
2、該批貨物運輸保險費用應當由中國A公司承擔，因為合同中簽訂的貿易術語是CIF方式交貨。
3、自離開上海港前，風險由A公司承擔。離開上海港至美國紐約港期間，風險轉移，由賣方承擔。
4、不可以。在CIF貿易術語下，買方只是承擔保險費，但貨物離開上海港後風險轉移到賣方
5、A公司。
（二）
不能。理由同上，由買方向保險公司索賠。不過賣方可以積極配合。

（如果採納，本人急需分啊）

⑤ 國際經濟法案例求答案

1.（1）2.（1）3.（2）4.（1）5.（3）6.（3）7.（2）8.（1）9.（2）

⑥ 急求一下國際經濟法案例的答案 謝謝

案例一：
1、因為A公司是賣家，且以CIF價格成交，所以，應由A公司與承運人C訂立運輸合內同。容
2、應有A公司向保險公司投保並交納保險費用。
3、A公司的交貨地點在天津港。
4、貨物運輸的風險在天津港貨物越過船舷時起由賣方轉移給買方。
5、1,500公斤大米由於灌水滅火受損和拖船廠費用屬於共同海損。

案例二：
1、應由瑞士迪高穀物有限公司負責與承運人訂立運輸合同。由糧油公司負責投保海上貨物運輸保險。
2、糧油公司的貨物短量、變質等的損失應由保險公司承擔。因為糧油公司向保險公司投保了一切險和戰爭險，包括短量險，所以貨物短量、變質等的損失應由保險公司承擔。
3、本案中貨物的損失有208.941公噸的短量和發紅變質的貨物4,927.389公噸。糧油公司可以直接向保險公司索賠。
4、保險公司在賠付了糧油公司後，能取得代位權，即由此取得了對責任方追索的權力。
5、依據我國現行法律的規定，保險公司可以向承運人行使這一權利。

⑦ 國際經濟法案例分析

產生和發展
國際經濟法的產生和發展 國際經濟法，是泛指調整國際經濟關系的各種法律規范。它是調整國際經濟關系的各法律規范的總稱。 何謂國際經濟關系？學者界說可分為兩大類。一說認為國際經濟關系專指國家政府之間、國際組織之間或國家政府與國際組織之間由於經濟交往而產生的各種關系；其主體，限於國家、國際組織以及在國際公法上具有獨立人格的其他實體。另一說則認為國際經濟關系不僅包含上述內容，而且包含屬於不同國家的個人之間、法人之間、個人與法人之間以及他們與異國政府或國際組織之間由於經濟交往而產生的各種關系；其主體，包括在國際民商法、國際私法上具有獨立人格的個人或組織，即屬於不同國家的國民個人（自然人）及各種法人。 國際經濟法，就其廣義的內涵而言，是各國統治階級在國際經濟交往方面協調意志或個別意志的表現。各國的統治階級為了自身的利益，總是盡力把自己所需要的各種秩序建立起來和固定下來，使它具有拘束力、強制力，於是就出現了各種法律規范。法律就是秩序創建的固定化和強制化。法律與秩序兩者之間的這種密切關系，是具有普遍性的。為維護各個歷史時期的國際經濟秩序制訂了具有一定約束力或強制性的國際經濟行為規范，即國際經濟法。它是鞏固現存國際經濟秩序的重要工具，也是促進變革舊國際經濟秩序、建立新國際經濟秩序的重要手段 衡諸歷史事實，上述第二種見解是可以接受的。迄今為止 ，國際經濟法經歷了萌芽、發展、轉折更新三大階段，而每一個大階段又可劃分為若干個時期。

⑧ 國際經濟法案例分析。。

1、銀行有沒有拒權利付，要看受益人是否按照信用證的規定行事和交單，而本案例並未說明信用證的最遲裝運期，只是說「合同約定：...自B公司收到信用證之日起1個月內裝運。隨後，A公司於5月29日開出了符合約定的信用證」，但是沒有說B公司是於哪一天收到的信用證，因此無從判定受益人於7月3日裝運是否遲於信用證規定的裝運期。所以說本案例的銀行拒付是否有理。

那麼為了解答本案例，那麼就假設受益人遲於信用證規定的最遲裝運期裝運，如果假設成立，那麼才可以說銀行有權拒付——因為信用證是有條件的付款承諾，即受益人必須按照信用證的規定行事，包括按照信用證規定的期限裝運貨物和提交符合信用證規定的單據，否則開證行就有權拒付。那麼前面假設受益人未按期裝運，所以，開證行拒付有理。

而假設而本案例中的受益人未遲於信用證規定的裝運期裝運，那麼開證行就沒有拒付的權利。

2、「由於台風登陸，使得B公司最快到7月3日才裝船出運」，那麼，假設受益人交貨遲於信用證規定的最遲交貨期，對於信用證而言，受益人屬於違約，而其違約責任就是被開證行拒付。而對於合同而言，由於台風屬於不可抗力，那麼，因收台風影響而推遲交貨，則不算違約，因為不可抗力屬於免責條款。

3、該批貨物的價格條款為FOB，所以保險費用不包括在單價里。保險合同應由買方A公司負責訂立。

⑨ 國際經濟法案例分析 高分求詳解

1、法律是否適用，要看合同的約定；
2、賣方在舊金山貨交承運人，完成交貨；
3、賣方無權以此理由拒絕履約，因為並無實際證據；
4、開證行付款的條件是看單單相符、單證相符，只審查單據表面相符，就要付款。

⑩ 國際經濟法案例分析題

1、紐約公司A向巴黎公司B采購一批物品，貨款結算方式為信用證，紐約花旗銀行2015年5月內4日開出一份信用證，編號為L/C3426。本容筆業務發票編號為95E03LC001，價值為10000.00美元，約定出票後30天付款，2015年5月13日B公司開具一張以紐約花旗銀行為付款人的遠期匯票。
（1）請根據以上內容製作一張匯票
（2）請以花旗銀行名義對這張匯票進行承兌。
（3）B公司將這張匯票背書轉讓給了法國的C公司，請幫助B公司做一個記名背書。