國際經濟法形考案列題

㈠ 求法律專業高手幫答國際經濟法案例分析題，題目如下。

我不專業~做著玩~跟你探討下~
1，火雞可以解除合同~（根本違約）專
只要在合同構屬成根本違約則可以解除合同，根本違約公約第二十五條：「一方當事人違反合同的結果，如使另一方當事人蒙受損害，以致於實際上剝奪了他根據合同規定有權期待得到的東西，即為根本違反合同，除非違反合同一方並不預知而且一個同等資格、通情達理的人處於相同情況中也沒有理由預知會發生這種結果。」
故第二種不是根本違約
2，承運人~原因：清潔提單的簽發責任~
3，b構成反要約~合同未成立

㈡ 關於國際經濟法的一道案例題

（1）有理，應支付。（2）可以，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。
「天不想亮」你懂不懂啊？這是英國法判例上大名鼎鼎的薰劑案！
Carlill Vs. Carbolic smoke ball
The Full decision of the case
APPEAL from a decision of Hawkins, J.(2)

The defendants, who were the proprietors and vendors of a medical preparation called "The Carbolic Smoke Ball," inserted in the Pall Mall Gazette of November 13, 1891, and in other newspapers, the following advertisement: "100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. 1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.

"During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.

"One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10, post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5 Address, Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London."

The plaintiff, a lady, on the faith of this advertisement, bought one of the balls at a chemist』s, and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. Hawkins, J., held that she was entitled to recover the 100 The defendants appealed.

Finlay, Q.C., and T. Terrell, for the defendants. The facts shew that there was no binding contract between the parties. The case is not like Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. Ad. 621), where the money was to become payable on the performance of certain acts by the plaintiff; here the plaintiff could not by any act of her own establish a claim, for, to establish her right to the money, it was necessary that she should be attacked by influenza - an event over which she had no control. The words express an intention, but do not amount to a promise: Week v. Tibold. 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.). The present case is similar to Harris v. Nickerson. Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 286. The advertisement is too vague to be the basis of a contract; there is no limit as to time, and no means of checking the use of the ball. Anyone who had influenza might come forward and depose that he had used the ball for a fortnight, and it would be impossible to disprove it. Guthing v. Lynn 2 B. Ad. 232 supports the view that the terms are too vague to make a contract, there being no limit as to time, a person might claim who took the influenza ten years after using the remedy. There is no consideration moving from the plaintiff: Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476. The present case differs from Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860, for there an overt act was done by the plaintiff on the faith of a statement by the defendants. In order to make a contract by fulfilment of a condition, there must either be a communication of intention to accept the offer, or there must be the performance of some overt act. The mere doing an act in private will not be enough. This principle was laid down by Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. The terms of the advertisement would enable a person who stole the balls to claim the reward, though his using them was no possible benefit to the defendants. At all events, the advertisement should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants. But, if there be a contract at all, it is a wagering contract, as being one where the liability depends on an event beyond the control of the parties, and which is therefore void under 8 9 Vict. c. 109. Or, if not, it is bad under 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2, as being a policy of insurance on the happening of an uncertain event, and not conforming with the provisions of that section.

Dickens, Q.C., and W. B. Allen, for the plaintiff. [THE COURT intimated that they required no argument as to the question whether the contract was a wager or a policy of insurance.] The advertisement clearly was an offer by the defendants; it was published that it might be read and acted on, and they cannot be heard to say that it was an empty boast, which they were under no obligation to fulfil. The offer was ly accepted. An advertisement was addressed to all the public - as soon as a person does the act mentioned, there is a contract with him. It is said that there must be a communication of the acceptance; but the language of Lord Blackburn, in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666, shews that merely doing the acts indicated is an acceptance of the proposal. It never was intended that a person proposing to use the smoke ball should go to the office and obtain a repetition of the statements in the advertisement. The defendants are endeavouring to introce words into the advertisement to the effect that the use of the preparation must be with their privity or under their superintendence. Where an offer is made to all the world, nothing can be imported beyond the fulfilment of the conditions. Notice before the event cannot be required; the advertisement is an offer made to any person who fulfils the condition, as is explained in Spencer v. Harding Law Rep. 5 C. P. 561. Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621 shews strongly that notice to the person making the offer is not necessary. The promise is to the person who does an act, not to the person who says he is going to do it and then does it. As to notice after the event, it could have no effect, and the present case is within the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 666. It is urged that the terms are too vague and uncertain to make a contract; but, as regards parties, there is no more uncertainty than in all other cases of this description. It is said, too, that the promise might apply to a person who stole any one of the balls. But it is clear that only a person who lawfully acquired the preparation could claim the benefit of the advertisement. It is also urged that the terms should be held to apply only to persons who bought directly from the defendants; but that is not the import of the words, and there is no reason for implying such a limitation, an increased sale being a benefit to the defendants, though effected through a middleman, and the use of the balls must be presumed to serve as an advertisement and increase the sale. As to the want of restriction as to time, there are several possible constructions of the terms; they may mean that, after you have used it for a fortnight, you will be safe so long as you go on using it, or that you will be safe ring the prevalence of the epidemic. Or the true view may be that a fortnight』s use will make a person safe for a reasonable time.

Then as to the consideration. In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E. B. 476, Lord Campbell never meant to say that if there was a direct invitation to take shares, and shares were taken on the faith of it, there was no consideration. The decision went on the form of the declaration, which did not state that the contract extended to future holders. The decision that there was no consideration was qualified by the words "as between these parties," the plaintiff not having alleged himself to be a member of the class to whom the promise was made.

Finlay, Q.C., in reply. There is no binding contract. The money is payable on a person』s taking influenza after having used the ball for a fortnight, and the language would apply just as well to a person who had used it for a fortnight before the advertisement as to a person who used it on the faith of the advertisement. The advertisement is merely an expression of intention to pay 100 to a person who fulfils two conditions; but it is not a request to do anything, and there is no more consideration in using the ball than in contracting the influenza. That a contract should be completed by a private act is against the language of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App. Cas. 692. The use of the ball at home stands on the same level as the writing a letter which is kept in the writer』s drawer. In Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E. B. 860 the fact was ascertained by a public, not a secret act. The respondent relies on Williams v. Carwardine 4 B. Ad. 621, and the other cases of that class; but there a service was done to the advertiser. Here no service to the defendants was requested, for it was no benefit to them that the balls should be used: their interest was only that they should be sold. Those cases also differ from the present in this important particular, that in them the service was one which could only be performed by a limited number of persons, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining with whom the contract was made. It is said the advertisement was not a legal contract, but a promise in honour, which, if the defendants had been approached in a proper way, they would have fulfilled. A request is as necessary in the case of an executed consideration as of an executory one:

Lampleigh v. Braithwait 1 Sm. L. C. 9th ed. pp. 153, 157, 159; and here there was no request. Then as to the want of limitation as to time, it is conceded that the defendants cannot have meant to contract without some limit, and three limitations have been suggested. The limitation "ring the prevalence of the epidemic" is inadmissible, for the advertisement applies to colds as well as influenza. The limitation "ring use" is excluded by the language "after having used." The third is, "within a reasonable time," and that is probably what was intended; but it cannot be deced from the words; so the fair result is that there was no legal contract at all.

看不懂？我給你大致講一下。法官是這么說的，雖然說廣告是對不特定人提出的，一般情況下屬於要約邀請（ITT），但是本案中，被告不僅將懸賞內容寫得十分具體，而且已經把1000英鎊存進銀行，充分顯示出它願意受到該廣告內容的約束（to be bound）,所以符合了要約的根本特徵，即受約束的意思表示。所以，本案中的廣告是一個要約。而原告通過購買並使用薰劑的行為作出了行為承諾。有要約，有承諾，這個合同就成立了。
英美法教材用這個案例來說明，要約不一定要向特定人發出，只要有明確的受約束的意思表示即可。

㈢ 求：國際經濟法案例分析題

這是我自己的解答：
1.提單具有三個法律性質。一，提單是托運人與承運人之間國際海上貨物運輸合同的證明（evidence）;二，提單是承運人接管貨物或貨物裝船的收據（receipt）。提單是承運人保證向收貨人交付貨物的物權憑證（title）。
2.承運人應該負責。因為本案例中承運人簽發的是倒簽提單，有欺詐之嫌。托運人的保函盡在托運人與承運人之間有效。承運人簽發了提單卻不能按約定交貨就必須承擔損害賠償責任，淡然承運人可憑保函的效力向托運人追償。

㈣ 國際經濟法案例分析題

1、紐約公司A向巴黎公司B采購一批物品，貨款結算方式為信用證，紐約花旗銀行2015年5月內4日開出一份信用證，編號為L/C3426。本容筆業務發票編號為95E03LC001，價值為10000.00美元，約定出票後30天付款，2015年5月13日B公司開具一張以紐約花旗銀行為付款人的遠期匯票。
（1）請根據以上內容製作一張匯票
（2）請以花旗銀行名義對這張匯票進行承兌。
（3）B公司將這張匯票背書轉讓給了法國的C公司，請幫助B公司做一個記名背書。

㈤ 跪求國際經濟法案例分析答案

1.玉米買賣合同、運輸合同、乙丙買賣合同。
2.適用。該公約適用條件是營業地位於不同國家的經營者之間。
3不適用。理由同上。適用我國合同法即可。
4.CIF術語的中譯名為成本加保險費加運費，在目的港當貨物越過船舷時賣方即完成交貨。賣方義務有提供符合合同規定的貨物，賣方必須自擔風險和費用，取得任何出口許可證或其他官方許可，並在需要辦理海關手續時，辦理貨物出口貨物所需的一切海關手續，賣方必須給予買方說明貨物已按照規定交貨的充分通知，以及要求的任何其他通知，以便買方能夠為受領貨物採取通常必要的措施。
5.乙丙之間達成合意即告合同成立，風險即發生轉移。屬於在途運輸合同的特殊規定。

㈥ 國際經濟法例分析題

國際經濟法是指調整國家之間；國際組織之間；國家與國際組織之間；國家與內他國私人之間；國際組織容與私人之間以及不同國籍私人之間，相互經濟關系的法律規范的總稱。它是隨著各國之間貿易和經濟往來日益增長以及國家對貿易和經濟活動的干預日益加強而形成和發展的。早在中世紀末期，歐洲主要商業城市就有一些關於國際商業交易的規則。第二次世界大戰後，有關國際經濟關系的法律規則和制度大量出現，並具有了國家之間條約的形式。作為一門學科，國際經濟法學也於第二次世界大戰後，逐漸發展起來。國際經濟法調整的是廣義的國際經濟關系，那麼它必然既包括國際法規范，也包括國內法規范；既包括公法，也包括私法。在經濟全球化加快的背景下，國際經濟關系、國際經濟秩序和國際經濟法的發展和更改，是在南北矛盾—交鋒—磋商—妥協—合作—協調—新的矛盾中曲折行進的。如何擴大和加強眾多發展中國家對世界經濟事務的發言權、參與權和決策權，把有關的「國際游戲規則」或行為規范制定得更加公平合理，從而更能促進建立起公平、公正、合理的國際經濟新秩序。面臨這一客觀需求，國際經濟法正在發生新的變化。

㈦ 國際經濟法案例分析題 跪求！！！

1）要約人抄是香港A商。受要約人襲是上海B公司。
2）3）自己看概念
4）A公司未成功撤銷自己的發盤。撤銷要件之一必須在受要約人作出承諾以前到達被要約人。事實上當他向香港電報局交發電報之前，B公司已經向上海電報局交發了對上述發盤接受的電報。未在受要約人承諾之前將撤銷的意思表示傳達給受要約人。因此，未能撤銷。
5）合同已經成立。合同成立的關鍵就是受要約人做出的承諾已經達到要約人。22日下午3時20分已經送達B公司，此時合同成立。